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NOTES 
Also see Stigler. 
Das, Chappell, and Shughart also find support of the production flexibility model. 
For more details, see Higgins, Shughart, and Tollison. 
Price data is Shipment Price Index (1982 = 100) collected from U.S. Department of 
Commerce (1989). . . 
C ffi . t f V . t" 100 Standard Dev1at1on oe 1c1en o aria ion = x Mean 
PV is a (163xl) column vector and ISV is also a (163xl) column vector because the data 
set comprises 163 manufacturing industries; MS, (1=1,2,3,4) is a (1793xl) column vector 
and same is true for KSR1 ( 1=1,2,3,4). [There are 163 manufacturing industries in each 
year and the study period is 1978 to 1988. Hence MS, and KSR1 are all (1793xl) column 
vectors.] So that the dimensions of MS, and KSR, are compatible with those of PV and 
ISV, the average values of MS1 and KSR1 for the eleven years have been calculated. 
Before estimation it is necessary to stack the four size categories under one another. 
The first-size category (smallest) is stacked at the top. Under the first-size category 
the second-size category is stacked. The third-size category is stacked under the 
second-size category and the fourth-size category (largest) is stacked at the bottom. 
Each of the variables (PV, MS, KSR, ISV) is therefore a (652xl) column vector. 
D1 = Dummy variable denoting first size category (smallest). The smallest size 
category consists of firms with $0-1 million in assets; D2 =Dummy variable for firms 
with $1-10 million in assets; D3 = Dummy variable for firms with $10-50 million in 
assets; D4 =Dummy variable for firms with $50-100 million in assets. 
D2MS =Interaction ofD2 and MS (D;MS); D3MS =Interaction ofD3 and MS (D/MS); 
D4MS =Interaction of D4 and MS <D;Ms). 
All variables are in natural logarithms. 
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Economics 
Socially Efficient Control of 
Carcinogen Emissions from Open 
'lbp Vapor Cleaners in lndiana1 
ROBERT S. MAIN 
Butler University 
Emissions of air pollutants have been a matter of concern for 
many years. Section 112 of the 1970 Clean Air Act directed the Environ-
mental Protection Agency to establish national emissions standards for 
hazardous pollutants (NESHAPS). By the late 1980s only sevenNESHAPS 
had been established by the EPA under the authority of section 112. 
Dissatisfaction with the slow progress of regulation led to passage of much 
more stringent provisions in the 1990 revisions of the Clean Air Act. Under 
those provisions, 189 toxic pollutants are to be listed and controlled by the 
maximum achievable control technology (MACT). The goal of the regula-
tions is the reduce emissions of these chemicals by 90% below uncontrolled 
levels by 2003. Many of the listed pollutants are carcinogens, and one 
source of some of these carcinogens in the atmosphere is industrial vapor 
cleaners. Some of these machines use carcinogenic solvents which escape 
into the atmosphere, and these solvents are to be listed and controlled by 
the EPA. In November 1992, the EPA is expected to publish new regula-
tions for the solvents used in vapor cleaners. The expectation by state 
regulators is that emission reductions of approximately 90% will be 
ordered by the EPA. 
Optimal control of an airborne carcinogen requires that each source 
of the carcinogen be controlled to the point where the Marginal Cost of 
Controlling emissions (MCC) is e11ual to the Marginal Damage from 
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emissions (MD) that applies to that source. The MCC is likely to increase 
as the degree of control increases, and the most reasonable assumption 
seems to be that the MD is a constant for any given source. Thus, there will 
be a unique optimal level of control for a given source. Both the MCC 
function and the MD are likely to differ among sources, however. This 
means that the optimal amount of control will generally differ from source 
to source. Consequently, a uniform percentage reduction in emissions or 
a uniform rule for the type of control to be installed will be inefficient. 
Because MD's differ among sources, even a uniform emission charge 
would be inefficient. 2 
This paper examines the benefits and costs of controlling emissions 
from open top vapor cleaners in Indiana. Making use of EPA engineering 
estimates of costs and effectiveness of a variety of control technologies, I 
estimate a marginal control cost schedule for several representative cases. 
Using Indiana data on the location of open top vapor cleaners, and the 
GEMS (Graphical Exposure Modeling System) computer program for 
estimating exposure to risk by the population surrounding each source, I 
estimate the dollar value of the damage to society from the emission of 
each pound of solvent for each location. There are three main empirical 
results. First, the marginal control cost schedule is a step function, and in 
each of the eight hypothetical cases examined, the first branch exhibits 
negative marginal control cost. This means that it is in the financial 
interest of owners to install at least some controls. Second, because of 
differences in population density in the areas surrounding different 
sources, there is substantial variation in the marginal damage caused by 
the emission of a pound of pollutant, depending on the location of the 
source. Third, in six of the eight hypothetical cases examined, the first 
positive branch of the marginal cost of control schedule exhibited a 
marginal control cost above any plausible value for marginal damage. For 
these cases, the socially optimal amount of control would be carried out by 
profit-maximizing firms. For the others, socially efficient control is only 
slightly more stringent than that which would be carried out voluntarily. 
Furthermore, this optimal control is invariably less stringent than that 
proposed in the 1990 Clean Air Act. 
Many manufacturing firms use machines called vapor cleaners to 
clean metal parts during processing. Vapor cleaners use special solvents 
(often carcinogens) to clean metal parts. In an uncontrolled environment, 
the vaporized solvents escape into the atmosphere, causing risks to 
persons in the vicinity of the facility. The amount of emission depends on 
how the machine is used (i.e., how many hours per week the machine is 
used to clean parts, how many hours it is turned on but not actually 
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cleaning parts (idling), and how many hours it is turned off) since 
emissions occur at different rates for different types of use. There are 
numerous control technologies that can be used individually or in combi-
nation to slow the rate of evaporation of the solvents (the EPA has 
proposed six such technologies). Because it is costly for firms to replace 
solvent lost from vapor cleaners, it may be privately efficient for them to 
install systems which recover some of the solvent. This is because the 
dollar value of the solvent recovered by using a control technology might 
exceed the cost of installing and using that technology. If this were to 
happen, the marginal cost of control would be negative for that control 
technology. However, because there is an externality, the socially efficient 
amount of control may be greater than the amount that it would be 
profitable for an unregulated firm to install. This would happen if the 
marginal damage were higher than at least some of the positive branches 
of the marginal control cost schedule. 
Although it is possible to install any combination from one to six of the 
available controls on any machine, the proportional reduction in emis-
sions is not the sum of the proportional reductions which the individual 
technologies would yield. Suppose controls 1 and 2 would separately 
reduce emissions by R
1 
= 90% and R2 = 20%, respectively. Then the 
reduction obtained by installing controls 1 and 2 together would be R 1 + 
(1- R)*R
2 
= R
1 
+ R
2 
- R
1 
*R
2 
= .9 + (1-.9)* .2 = .92. Similar expressions apply 
to any combination of controls. 
The EPA document3 provides the information necessary to estimate 
the annualized cost of installing any control technology, given the operat-
ing schedule and given the size of the unit. Using the EPA estimates of 
proportional reductions in emissions for each of the control technologies, 
and assuming a particular operating schedule (a certain number of hours 
per year working, a certain number idling, and a certain number shut 
down) one can calculate the total reduction in annual emissions and the 
annual cost that could be expected from installing any package of one or 
more controls. My procedure for calculating the Marginal Control Cost (MCC) is to 
determine the lowest cost order in which to add controls. First, assume a 
certain operating schedule (i.e., a certain number of hours of cleaning, 
idling and shut down) with no controls in place. Calculate the annual cost 
for each control technology alone. Calculate the recovery of solvent for 
each control technology alone. Calculate the recovery of solvent that each 
control would provide if applied alone. Net out the dollar value (evaluated 
at the purchase price) of the recovered solvent from the gross cost. Divide 
the net cost by the amount of recovered solvent (in pounds). Choose the 
~ 
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technology with the lowest cost per pound. That cost is the first "step" of 
the Marginal Control Cost schedule. With that technology assumed in 
, place, recalculate the net cost per pound of additional recovery for the 
remaining technologies. The net cost per pound for each of the remaining 
technologies will be no lower than it would have been in the first round, 
and it will be higher for any technology which controls the same kind of 
emissions as the first technology chosen. Since the first technology chosen 
had, by construction, the lowest cost per pound of any technology, given ; 
no prior control, the lowest cost per pound of the remaining group must be 
higher than that for the first technology chosen. Thus successive steps of 
the MCC schedule must be ascending. Continue to add technologies from 
those remaining until all have been employed. The cost per pound of 
reducing emissions using each successive technology represents the 
contingent marginal cost (contingent on having employed the least costly 
contingent strategy in each previous step).4 
One unusual result of the calculation of Marginal Costs for controlling 
emissions from open top vapor cleaners is that the first technology 
employed has a negative marginal cost in each of the eight hypothetical 
cases examined. As noted above, this happens because the dollar value of 1
1 
the solvent recovered because of control exceeds the gross cost of the first 
stage of control. Thus it would be in the interest of owners to undertake 
some control even ifit were not required. Note also that, because of the way 
I constructed it, the Marginal Control Cost rises as the degree of control 
increases. Additionally, as one approaches 100% reduction in emissions, 
the Marginal Control Cost rises dramatically (in one case to over $20 per 
extra pound of emission reduction). While it would be possible in every 
case I studied to employ enough controls to reduce emissions by at least 
80% (and usually more than 9(Yl/o), the rapidly rising Marginal Control 1 
Cost schedule means that this would be inefficient unless the Marginal 
Damage from emissions was exceedingly high. 
The results of using the EPA's control effectiveness, cost and operat-
ing schedule assumptions are shown in Table 1. The table shows eight 
MCC schedules. This corresponds to the possibilities when there are two 
possible operating schedules, two possible sizes of machine, and high and 
low estimates for the control effectiveness of some control technologies. 
Figure 1 illustrates graphically how the MCC increases as successive 
controls are added for case 1. 
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Marginal Cost of Control Schedules for Eight Scenarios 
Case Stepl Step2 Step3 Step4 Step5 
Step6 
% MCC % MCC % MCC 
Red. Red. Red. 
1 21.0 -.22 50.9 .32 78.9 .60 
2 20.4 -.21 41.9 .38 69.9 .60 
3 21.0 -.32 73.4 -.25 84.6 .40 
4 19.3 -.31 73.1 -.25 79.5 .99 
5 26.6 -.10 54.6 -.05 70.0 .001 
6 26.6 -.10 54.6 -.06 70.0 .01 
7 66.4 -.34 81.9 .14 90.0 .21 
8 66.4 -.34 74.4 .21 81.l .27 
% MCC % MCC % MCC 
Red. Red. Red. 
85.8 1.98 92.1 7.76 93.0 24.16 
77.0 2.58 85.2 6.48 86.4 16.37 
92.7 1.52 95.8 7.45 96.5 15.18 
87.5 1.52 92.3 4.72 93.0 14.91 
85.8 El 91.l 2.86 92.4 6.66 
81.0 1.17 85.2 4.33 86.4 7.15 
92.7 1.23 95.8 2.11 96.5 5.98 
88.5 .67 92.3 1.80 93.0 5.87 
Case 1: Small, Op. Sched. A, High Est. 
Case 2: Small, Op. Sched. A, Low Est. 
Case 3: Small, Op. Sched. B, High Est. 
Case 4: Small, Op. Sched. B, Low est. 
Case 5: Large, Op. Sched. A, High Est. 
Case 6: Large, Op. Sched. A, Low Est. 
Case 7: Large, Op. Sched B, High Est. 
Case 8: Large, Op. Sched. B, Low Est. 
Small= 4.5 sq. ft. in area; Large= 16.0 sq. ft. in area. Op. Sched. A= Work 2 hrs. 
per day, five days per week; idle 6 hrs. per day, five days per week; shut down the 
rest of the time. Op. Sched. B =Work 12 hrs. per day, five days per week; idle 4 
hrs. per day, five days per week; shut down the rest of the time. 
$ 
24.16 
7.76 
1.98' 
.60 
.321 
-.22 
Fig. 1. Marginal Control Cost Schedule for Casel. 
MCC 
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Because of the cooperation of the Indiana Department of Environ-
mental Management (IDEM), I was able to obtain data on the location, 
size, hours of operation, current controls of place, type of solvent used, and 
many other facts about the open top vapor cleaners in use in Indiana. In 
addition, I employed the PC version of the Graphical Exposure Modeling 
Systems (PC-GEMS). This program, developed under contract to the 
EPA, uses location of the source, height of the exhaust stack, type of 
solvent, speed at which pollutants exit, and quantity of emissions to 
estimate the ambient concentration of the solvent in regions surrounding 
the source. Using population density in the surrounding regions and 
cancer dose-response estimates for the solvent, GEMS then calculates an 
estimate of the number of cancer deaths the persons surrounding the 
source could be expected to suffer during their lifetime due to one year's 
exposure to the solvent at the ambient level that results from that source's 
annual emissions. If one multiplies this by an assumed dollar value forthe 
saving of a "statistical" life, the result is the total dollar value of cancer 
damage from a year's worth of emissions from the source in question. To 
obtain the damage per pound emitted (Average Damage), divide by the 
number of pounds emitted in one year. Since the dose response curve is 
usually assumed to be linear, the Average Damage will be constant and 
equal to the Marginal Damage. 
For illustrative purposes, I assumed a value oflif e-saving of $3 million 
per life.5 Assuming the solvent is Trichloroethylene (the most common of 
the carcinogenic solvents con,sidered), the Marginal Damage per pound 
emitted;t>er year ranges from $.001 to $.04, with an average of $.014. 
Except for the two cases of the large lightly used cleaner, these Marginal 
Damages fall below the lowest positive Marginal Control Costs. 
Although exposure factors differ among sources by a factor of about 
45, the optimal amount of control of open top vapor cleaners in Indiana is 
usually unaffected by the level of exposure. In most cases, the amount of 
control that would be undertaken by a well-informed profit-maximizing 
firm is the socially optimal amount. This is because (with "reasonable" 
assumptions) the Marginal Damage caused by the emission of a pound of 
solvent is usually substantially less than the level of Marginal Control 
Cost when it first becomes positive. The policy implication seems to be that 
the best strategy, at least in Indiana, is to inform owners of open top vapor 
cleaners of the benefits, in the form of reduced solvent purchase costs, of 
certain controls, depending on the size and operating schedule of the 
machine. Then they should be allowed to decide for themselves what the 
proper level of control is. 
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1. I wish to thank the Holcomb Research Institute (HRI) for generous support of this 
project during the summer of 1989. I also wish to thank the Indiana Department of 
Environmental Management (IDEM), particularly Bob Bierman and Barry Titus, 
without whose help and encouragement this project would have been impossible. In 
addition, I wish to thank an anonymous referee and Albert Nichols for valuable 
comments and J. Patrick Meister for research assistance and counsel. Candee Carter 
generously helped me understand how vapor cleaners are used in practice. The 
opinions expressed in this paper are mine and do not necessarily reflect those of HRI 
or IDEM, nor should they be held responsible for any errors. 
2. Nichols, Targeting, Chapter 6, especially pp. 85-86. 
3. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Alternative Control Technology Document. 
4. Albert Nichols has pointed out to me that this procedure only approximates the true 
marginal cost of control schedule. It ignores the possibility of intermediate steps in the 
control process. For example, suppose uncontrolled emissions are 100, and there are 
two control technologies, A and B. Suppose A alone would reduce emissions by 80 at 
a cost of $400, or $5 per unit, while B alone would reduce emissions by 90 at a cost of 
$630, or $7 per unit. My procedure would have two steps. The first would be to reduce 
emissions by 80 with a marginal control cost of $5 per unit (A), and the second would 
be to increase control from 80 to 98, by adding control B to control A, at a marginal cost 
of $35 per unit. Nichols points out that an intermediate step would be to employ B 
instead of A and increase control from 80 to 90, at a marginal cost of$23 per unit. Then 
the move from an emission reduction of90 to 98 would be accomplished by adding back 
control A, at a marginal cost of $50 per unit. My $35 marginal control cost is the 
weighted average of $23 and $50. Thus my approach is cruder than the correct 
approach. Instead of three steps of $5, $23 and $50, my marginal control cost schedule 
has two steps of $5 and $35. This could perhaps increase the amount of control which 
firms would carry out on their own, but it would not change the main conclusions of 
the paper. 
5. Nichols, Targeting, at 136, argues that it is difficult to rule out values per life saved 
of from several hundred thousand dollars to several million dollars. A figuce of $1 
million to $2 million in 1980 dollars, while high, is not completely unbelievable. Thus 
a figure of $3 million in 1989 dollars is, while probably on the high side, conceivable. 
Note the reasoning used by Bailey, Reducing. 
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